"The soul has two parts, one rational and the other irrational. Let us now similarly divide the rational part, and let it be assumed that there are two rational faculties, one whereby we contemplate those things whose first principles are invariable, and one whereby we contemplate those things which admit of variation."-Aristotle

Within the contents of the prolegomenous introduction of the soul I present as an intercourse, I shall discuss the philosophical concepts and aspects of the extraordinary soul that are a vivid constatation of the numerous states of the soul that are perhaps more construed, as theoretical in their pure essence and exhibition. What I shall attempt to elaborate in my discourse is an enymerotis and gnosis of the expansive hegemonikon of philosophy and its communicable value and katalepsis. Thus, I shall begin with what the word 'soul' actually meant to the knowledgeable sages and demos of Ancient Greece and what would have been the dianoetic conclusion of the experimental idea and intricacy of the soul, in accordance to the existence and compatibility of the soul and consciousness.

When we address the intellectual subject of the soul with epignosis, we must first accentuate the diaphoretic and congruent theories of the ancient Greeks expatiated comparatively. We are informed of this comparison with the epimartyresis of the distinct Presocratic thinkers and the philosophical theories that are our primary reference, for any plausible argument predicated on the establishment of the existential soul. We know of the intrinsic thoughts and explainable doxas of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics, on the specific matter and concept of the soul's composition and existence, because of the metron of their pronounced theories and the poiens of the dedicated followers.

Socrates believed in a philosophical concept of the one or the good, which could be then interpreted as the Demiurgos or a Universal Creator that was not to be idolised or worshipped, but to function, as a normative and teleological purpose for his absolute existence. The establishment of logical order was necessary and paramount to understand the actual capacity of the mind, intellect, and intelligence, within its form and consequent effects. The nous required an animated soul and the psyche had to be then embodied, in order to exist within the ample sphere of the living beings it was associated to its conversion. Thus, we can only suspect with the conventional thought that living beings such as ourselves, have only at our gradual disposal an approximate knowledge of the explicit validity of matter that can function in a metaphysical manner, where the nous can function without the immediate interaction of matter. The soul was believed to be the incorporeal or spiritual "breath" that animated the process of life and its continuation. Socrates explicitly appealed to the considerable notion that it is the soul that animates the body and consciousness of a living thing or being, with its modification. The magnitude of that thought can be perceived and realised, as a variable of an unparalleled contingency and interval.

Socrates offered fundamental arguments in his exposition for the soul's existence: The Cyclical Argument or Opposites Argument, that explicated that forms are eviternal and as the soul always emanates life, then it must not cease in its prolongation and is imperishable than immaterial. The argument from recollection that is based on his theory of recollection. That theory was an explanation of how we can know the kinds of things that we can understand. The simplicity argument that the soul existed before birth. Socrates' arguments differ from the Cosmogonical argument of the soul by Aristotle. To Aristole there are three basic variants of the argument, each with subtle yet important differentiations: the arguments from in causa (causality), in esse (essentiality), and in fieri (becoming). They are all aligned to the multiple elements of causation, change, motion, contingency, or finitude in respect of the universe, as a whole or the process within its congruence and semblance. The soul of Socrates could be then interpreted to reflect the transcendence of the possibilities and extension of the soul.

As for the concept of the Platonic soul, it consisted of three main parts, the logos, (mind, nous, or reason) the thymos, (emotion, spiritedness, or masculine) the eros (appetitive, desire, or feminine). Plato thought that the soul could exist separately from the vehicle of the body, but Aristotle disagreed with that firm assumption. Aristotle believed that only one part of the soul was eternal in particular the intellect (logos), and therefore, it would require the presence of a primal vehicle or hypodochemene to function properly. The soul of Plato is affirmative in the physical nature of its transpicuous matter. I tend to rationalise Aristotle' concept of the soul, lesser than the concepts of Socrates and Plato, because the metaphysical argument is more deduced. The contrast between the three philosophers is emphasised, in the discrepancy of the interpretation of the soul. Aristotle stated that the soul neither existed without a body nor is a body of some constitution. For it is not a body, but it belongs to a body, and for this particular reason is present in a body, and in a body of some existing composition. Yet, what is not fully understood is the interpretation of what is veraciously meant by the soul is not a body and that it depends on the one and its unique dimension. I am under the impression that the key is defining the property of the soul, as the intelligible plane of the universal hypodochemene that is extant and indefinite in, its essence. For Aristotle, the soul was the primal foundation of the form and matter of a natural being, which adhibited it to reach its total actuality. This structure between form and matter is elemental and necessary for any kind of activity or functionality, to be possible in a natural being. Aristotle asserted, "What is it that, when present in a body, makes it living?-A soul."

The fascinating concatenation between the soul and body, according to Aristotle, was also an example of the general concatenation between form and matter with its synaition. Thus an ensouled, living body is a singular kind of matter. If we began to apply simplicity to the relative things by limiting ourselves to the observation of the sublunary world as eonta within the intelligible, then its symbebekos permits us to conceive afterwards, the ensoulment of the synechy of our hypodochemene and its entelechy, as an instrument of alethic existence and not an anomaly. This would allow the observer the acute perception and phrontis of the syschetis, between the terrestrial world and the universal hypodochemene. We must fully understand the nature of the impermanence of human existence.

In regard to the metathanaton or afterlife, Aristotle's belief on the subject was not postulated in the interpretative form of any individualistic term of which, we associate to the orismos and homily of religion. He believed in the principle of the prime mover and the active intellect that is evidently attributed to the mechanism of our quotidian functions. Even though it is presumed that our lives abate, when these functions abate at the ominous stage of death the only thing that is truly confirmed as absolute evidence is the affirmation of our mortal expiry. Hence, the origin of that finality is recognised, in the systematicity of its logical conclusion. Death is the final process of our physicality, and human consciousness is the dominant energy that is the akatalepton of science. There is no peritrope or aphairesis of the process and the only thing that remains is the phroniman.

The Ancient Greeks had accepted the existence of the soul after death; although there was no real consensus on the extent of the topic and there was an eclectic divergence of opinion and hypothesis. The conceptualisation of the soul should not be acknowledged as an allotrion, but as a philosophic presumption. Philosophy is to be comprehended, for its important relativity to the mind. It is not a mere unfounded conjecture that must be substantiated by science, when there is a protic principle introduced in the criterion and possibility.

Aristotle had considered the incorporeal soul to be the sempiternal occupancy of our being that was reflected in our evolving intellect. He stated that the soul was the supreme actuality of a body that had the subsistence of a genuine life in its transparency. If we regard life to mean the visible capacity for self-substance as a composite of matter and form, then the soul is the actual form of a natural body that exists. Aristotle defined the soul as the first actuality of a natural body that has life and potentiality. He stated also that the soul assists human beings to find the truth, but to ultimately understand the actual purpose or role of the soul was controvertible and controversial, because of its convoluted nature and premise.

When we attempt to explicate the purpose of the soul in philosophy, we either utilise metaphysics or noesis to the plethos of our thoughts or concepts that are attributed to our arguments or criterions. We can dispute the vague interpretation of any form of philosophy in our Pyrrhonism, but if the ascribable presumption is based on a reasonable contingency of principles, then the a fortiori argument should not be entirely dismissed as implausible. Thus, within the heterogeneity of provisory notions, there is a point of the convergence of our thoughts with the hyparxis of the soul that can be validated, with our conspection and the epideictic interpretation of the hypolepsis of the soul.

Once we have established the existing premise of the function of the soul and its purpose, we then can elucidate on the verification and intrinsicality of the existential soul, within an exponible deduction. To assert that there is a noumenal effect equated to the soul is not a mere paralogism or a dilogical proposition, when we examine the full perception of the human mind and its boundaries. The field of science associates the brain to our consciousness, yet there is a definite distinction, between the meaning of the brain and the mind, in the comprehension of philosophy. The brain is the central part of the visible, tangible world of the body, whilst the mind is the central part of the invisible, transcendent world of thought, feeling, attitude, belief and clear imagination that manifest in our body and soul. The brain is the physical organ most associated with the mind and consciousness, but the mind is not confined to the perimeters or limitation of the brain. Therefore, the mind can be perceived in its existential matter and form, if that protreptical inherency is established to the basic relativity of its existence and continuation. The different states of the consciousness of the mind can asseverate the idea of that veracity and illative analysis.

With the efficiency of a consectary purview, we could then assume the apodicticity of the soul, within the expository stoicheions of philosophy, as a zetetic reference and not an anapodictic maxim or an unnecessary extrapolation of the diachronicity of the soul. We are cognisant of the process of the dedition of the body in death, yet we are uncertain of the in esse and in posse states of the soul, after the completion of life. From the divergence of those two states, the fundamental thing that is definite is the transformation of one state to another. This would not imply the states are antithetical to the function of this action, since the actuality is not contradictory to the potentiality of that pancosmic relevance.

To acknowledge that the soul exists is not illogical to the quintessential nature and endiapheron of philosophy, when we establish the antevenient course of the soul and the possibility of the soul's prolongation. If we acknowledge the soul's existence, we do not need to accede to the cunctation of that possibility, within the compoundable nature of the alterity of the soul as existential. To be more precise, the existence that is the transumption of the soul is universal and thus conducive to the idea that the soul can be considered is universally endless. We possess the symphytic ability to perceive matter and form, as we possess the ability to relate to the idea of that anaptixis. Can it not be asserted that the soul is a compressed consciousness and matter is compressed energy?

What should be learnt about the imminution of mortal life is the irrefragable essence and continuum of the soul. If we then proceeded with the quondam thought, the metonymic comparison between existence and the soul would be better understood, beyond the axiom of the argument of the soul, as the existence is the monad and the soul as the dyad or second cause. The problem that conflicts with other forms of philosophy, religion and science is the descriptive nature and feasibility of the soul and its diastasy. Within the complex nature of human observation is the epeigon to dismiss the soul, as immaterial. If we obviously applied a heuristic observation to the soul, we would discover the omnibus of the optimal probaliorism of the probative soul and its ipseity, as a form of consciousness. This would allow us to enquire the reason and the inusitate effects determined, with that metemperical observation. The argument would be misconstrued for platitude or sciolism, instead for the basis of the quiddative elements of a desitive synthesis that was reflected of any measure of apodicticism.

Is conscience the desideratum of the soul or is it a dilogical discept of an Eleutherian sense? If we analyse the germaneness of the methexis of the concept of the soul, we will surmise that the conscience is a mechanism or instrument of the soul's existing manifestation. Ergo, that declared statement would result in a utible philosopheme. If we described the universal states of the mirific soul in our synomily, we would conclude, then that the adumbration of the definition of the soul is found in the realm or omphalos of the ornic conscience.

To debate the hylism of the soul's form of existence is to distinguish the megalopsychy of the soul and its dilation, with the synanthropic nature of human beings. This would not contradict, with the ratiocination for the argument of the soul as existential. The hypodochetic reference to the soul is attached to the quale of the soul, within the transitivity of its longevity. I must denote that the theory of palingenesis within philosophy is highly contested, but the hyponoia and properties of the soul are emphasised and are not the endechomen of the argument at all.

Hence, if we applied the theory of the principle of universal causation that implicates all things have causes, though not necessarily deterministic causes, then we can metaphysically conceive of the noeton or the intelligible as a living soul. Whether we regard the soul, as a numinosity of the stasis of its hegemonical reference or the heteron of the body is a mere question of interpretation. The principle of universal causation is sustained in this argument, because the cause of the soul is connected to the hypodochemene. From the universal hypodochemene that is the soul, we are conscious of the apthartos, in the horismos and kathodos of the synechy of the soul that is conducive to the volition and function of the soul. To better comprehend the hypodochomene, we must first comprehend the hyperousia of the nature of the soul, with the sophrosyne that supports this philosopheme. To understand the nature of the hyperousia there must be a hypostasis to define the soul. If we insinuate that pure consciousness is the hypostasis of that soul, then the hyperousia of the soul would be an idion of the universe.

How do we rationalise that in a logical form of metaphysics that is relative to the argument presented? How do we conceive the plausibility of the soul, as a form of consciousness that is not a homonymy of an irrational thought? How do we associate its aition or cause to the adiaireton of the matter that the soul is consisted of its existence and katachronon?

To effectuate that we could use Aristotle's actuality concept which is used, with the concept of dynamis that signifies the two known modes of existence and physis. Within this remarkable comparison, the actuality is the living aspect of the soul and the potentiality is the conscious aspect of the soul. The nexus would demonstrate the state of each variable and proteanness. We would then be able to discern the distinction from the actuality to the potentiality, in the relativity of the consciousness of the soul and its induement.

Aristotle wrote in his Metaphysics: If there were no other independent things besides the composite natural ones, the study of nature would be the primary kind of knowledge; but if there is some motionless independent thing, the knowledge of this precedes it and is first philosophy, and it is universal in just this way, because it is first. And it belongs to this sort of philosophy to study being as being, both what it is and what belongs to it just by virtue of it. We could easily apply this known clarification of metaphysics to the universe and the living soul.

For Aristotle, the soul is the existing and ultimate form of any living being. Because all beings are composites of form and matter, the form of living beings is that which imbues them with what is particular to living beings that defines their true essence that consists of that matter in its supervenience. The epagoge of that meticulous observation can be perceived, as being protreptical and logical in the study of metaphysics. Subsequently, the noetic pysmaticity into the subject was continued, by other prominent philosophers, who advocated the philosophical teachings on the material and progressed the euporia and diatiris of that knowledge or jorexis.

To imply that the soul is existential is not unreasonable or desipient, when we realise the nature of the concept of existence. The intrinsic nature of the quiddity of the soul is discovered in syneidesis or consciousness, and demonstrative in the universal states of the variables of the soul. There is no greater form of deliberation used than the telos of the arsis nous learnt in the universal knowledge of philosophy that is defined, as pantosophy. We can implement the knowledge of pantosophy to facilitate the prime function, for the application of syneidesis and synderesis, with its entire activation and vathos. Philosophy can debate the midenism of the zoilists and resolve the engrossing questions and axioms of metaphysics that transcend any subdoxastic conformity or unalterable perception.

With philosophy we learn about the signification of the ulterior purpose of the monos of the one and endoxa of the soul in unison. We learn the special connection of the one and the soul that invariably corresponds to the process of life and death that is linked to the heimarmene of the soul and not its soterion. We contemplate the nature of the psyche also, with the various assumptions of the soul and the extrinsic influence of science. The omnilegent nature of the topic of the hypodochemene and the ephemeron life cycle of the human soul is not to be related to the piacular notion of nocence and kenotic repentance in religion, or the fidimplicitary negations and rebuttals of science. Simply, there is a koinelogic or common sense to the understanding of the soul and its omoitity.

If everything that is involved with the process of animation were to die and remain in that invariable state and not continue to exist through the entire culmination of the process, would not everything ultimately have to be dead and nothing alive in the universe? Even if the living continued from some other origin, and all that had lived died, how could all things conceivably avoid being absorbed, in the absoluteness of death and not evolve? If death defines the limit of our universal existence, then life would be defined, as inconsequential. It would imply that the actuality of our existence is attached to a nothingness that has no growth or potentiality in the end. Therefore, the purpose for our existence would be reduced to a recollection of memories that defined our essence in the cosmos, as strictly physical. That would be a kenotity of no original aphorme of a living existence.

The actual composition of the body is earthly, visible, ponderous, and the purity of the soul is universal, invisible and weightless. The physical desires and pleasures are visible, and the soul is invisible and conscious. Pleasure or pain provides, as it is, another element to link the body to the soul. The soul becomes corporeal in its constitution, so that it believes the veracity is what the body suggests it is defined. As it elaborates the thoughts and enjoyments of the body, the soul inevitably manifests to share its ways and manner of life, but is incapable ever to reach a pure state of somatic sublimity. When the body dies, cannot the soul become one with the universe? We must be prosetic and learn to distinguish with the rationality of our senses, knowledge and consciousness, between the pure and impure states of the soul.

The soul is the quiddity of a living body that has the principle of movement and all the characteristics for life. It is the perfect harmony of the body, beautiful and pleasant in its essence and egrigorsis, whilst the body is merely physical and composite, in its matter and form, as bones and flesh. The body can never reach the optimality of the soul and the soul the extension of the body. If the soul is not limited to a physical plane, it would not be restricted like the body to the physical conformity of the universal laws in its entirety. Thus, is it reasonable to surmise that the soul's existence did not begin, with the birth of the body, but at the stage of an evolutionary process of the universe? Within the implausibility of that unique supposition is the feasibility of the origin of the breath of life and its continual existence.

If we analysed the following statement of Aristotle with a punctilious solicitude and antilipsis, "The soul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being besouled," we would conclude and treat the soul as an instance of form and of actuality, and in a parallel manner treat the body, as an instance of matter and of potentiality, according to this belief of Aristotle. We began with a simple aphorism that described the intrinsic relation of the body and soul and elaborated the conception of the physicalistic nature of the body and the origin of the soul afterwards. If we agree that the soul possess a form of inner energy and empsycha that are relevant to the universe and metaphysics, then the conclusion would not be unintelligible.

If we used the application of the logic of metaphysics, then there must be clearly, an opposite to everything in the cosmos, as there is an invariable to a variable in physics and an even number to an odd number in mathematics. It may appear scientifically that death is the only truth of the soul and opposite of life, because death is the only apparent guise of the eventual abatement of human existence; yet, the universal transition from life to death is only valid and consequential, when we refer to mortality. If we inferred that logic is the dianoetic system of thought, then we would deduce that the soul is the logical invisibility of our essence and the body, the visibility of our death. Death would not seem to be the practical illusion of our divisibility and everlasting life, within the coherent continuity of our indivisibility. If this is so, then cannot the relativity of the soul and consciousness be presumed, as a natural occurrence that is reflective of the natural phenomena of the evolving matrix that is the ephigeneiac universe?

To assume that the preservation of the soul is attached to its identity, causation, and determinism is not irrelevant to the metaphysical notion of its capacity, as a universal hypodochemene. This would display the definite and demonstrative aspect of the soul, as a logical provider for the mind and body, but equally the body and mind would provide substantial nourishment for the soul. The body serves as the physical vehicle of the soul and mind. The mind serves as the prime sustainer of thoughts and the soul the existential consciousness of our thoughts. This would be conducive to the irreversible process that accompanies the regular intervals of the function of the mind, body and soul. The argumentation would then be lucid, in its premise and correlation. What must be carefully established is the universality of the soul and the reality of our consciousness. What we believe essentially in our mind to be reality is often misconstrued, as surreality.

Within the epipede syneidesis, we must reach a complex heightened state of syneideticity or condition of consciousness to understand the universal essence and capacity of the hypodochemene. We can reach that superb state of awareness, through the practice of meditation and cognition. Only then, we can reconcile the synecdoche to the process of the importance of the soul and realise the variance and alloiosis of the states of our consciousness. There is an evident contrast in that consciousness, between the hyparchein in the soul of the eudaimon and the kakodaimon through our good deeds or bad vices that are exposed in our conscience, with the agathon and kakia of the soul. The distinction is of an unparalleled magnitude, when we take into consideration, the ethical value of their significance. We must learn to be at peace with our soul, through the comforting state of iponomy and not adimony. Within the reverie of the state of consciousness and stoicheism, is the relativity of the effulgence of the universe and its existing properties of which the soul is one of those intellectual properties revealed, for the sake of the posterity and the aeons of the cosmogony.